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Introduction 
The growing popularity of British films made prior to and during the Second 
World War is well reflected in both the academic attention this era has received 
and the ever-increasing number of DVD-releases of classical cinema. The 
fascination film/cultural historians and contemporary audiences show towards 
these motion pictures has elevated them to a cult status. However, ‗cult 
film/cinema‘ is a low-specificity umbrella term, thus its application requires 
careful consideration. Cult films – as we understand them today – rely heavily 
on self-reflexive uniqueness, unusual visual or acting styles, oddball topics, 
eccentric narrative techniques or anything that breaks with mainstream 
conventions. These are not the features of mainstream productions but are 
constitutive of the peripheral cinematic output. Eric Schaeffer in his book on the 
origins of exploitation film, for example, shows how early censorship of topics 
related to sexual hygiene created a cult cinema that departed from Hollywood 
standards and norms.1 This process of detachment from the mainstream may be a 
motor behind the birth of new genres and/or the refinement of generic 
representation, still the cult following of certain types of films does not 
necessarily overturn the mainstream logic of cinematic production and 
consumption. 
Cult in the original sense of the world refers to ritual behaviour and a set of 
practices of worship, and as such, it has rich religious connotations. Manifesting 
itself in rituals, ceremonies and liturgy, cult conserves and rigidifies a certain 
frame of mind, manners, values and morality. It is this capacity to mummify 
which Friedrich Nietzsche criticised (most notably) in the Twilight of Idols, 
denouncing the cult of authority as the sign of decadence in culture. A similar 
reading of cult is offered by Harry Allan Potamkin, who in the early 1930‘s 
studied and denounced the cult status of melodrama, a genre in which ―it is the 
treatment and not the material that counts‖ (28). He writes: ―[t]his attitude must 
be fought as a form of intellectual selling out. The movie is more than a ‗passing 
amusement‘. And deceptive platitudes limiting it to the snobbery or laziness of 
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the cultist must be exploded‖ (28).2 Simply put, Potamkin stresses the overt anti-
intellectualism and escapism of melodrama, something comparable to blind 
idolisation: ―cults are never self-critical, they are never objective. So that when 
they do turn on the idol of their creation, it is not a progressive act, but an act of 
treachery‖ (28). What Potamkin describes as cinematic cults are those stylistic, 
narrative and content-based mummies, clichés which seem timeless and 
authoritative: a (passively) received, oversimplifying and escapist formula. 
Either understood as a divergence from or a convergence with the 
mainstream, cults and specifically cinema as a cult is closely connected with the 
cultural forces it connects with. In this paper I will analyse the state of the 
British film industry from this double perspective and discuss (1) how it both 
rejected and accepted the cult of Hollywood, (2) how it became a mirror of 
social change and national unity, and last but not least (3) how it came to 
articulate a symbolic image of Britishness, an image that has been a point of 
reference ever since and is responsible for the enduring popularity of films from 
this period.  
I. 
Potamkin described cinematic cultism as a modern worship that goes far beyond 
the single genre of the melodrama. As a cultural commodity of overwhelming 
magnitude on both side of the Atlantic, the moving image had unprecedented 
influence on public opinion both as a vehicle of ideological populism and as a 
means of disseminating normative and uniform lifestyles and standardised social 
values. The Hollywood studios could not have managed to strengthen their 
positions in Europe had they not employed models of identification that were 
appealing to audiences of different nationalities. The unique position their films 
enjoyed in the period is definitely linked to the powerful visions these movies 
offered of the American past and present, identity and national character. The 
emergence of the western and gangster genre was instrumental in strengthening 
the consensual understanding of what values, beliefs and ethical principles 
America as a culturally diverse community should foster. In order to understand 
the full impact of Hollywood on Europe, one has to consider the nationalist 
discourse wrapped up in high production values and glamour. What arrived from 
the new world were not just endless reels of celluloid dreams but 
uncompromisingly monumental testimonies of the unbound American spirit, 
glorious accounts of national dignity which unquestionably spellbound 
audiences. Moreover, opposed to this sense of optimism, most of the countries 
involved in the Great War still carried deep wound and traumas and saw a threat 
in overt nationalism. 
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The popularity of American films was overwhelming in Britain, as 
suggested by the figures Robert Murphy gives: ―[b]y 1926 thirty-seven British 
films competed with over five hundred American imports‖ (47). European 
companies with their less efficient or non-existent vertical system of production, 
distribution and screening had a major handicap. Although the Cinematograph 
Films Act of 1927 resulted in an increase in the number of British films made up 
until  the end of the thirties, the annual audiences of just under one billion3 
ensured comfortable American market dominance. To counterbalance this 
supremacy, UK production companies sought to satisfy domestic audiences by 
putting on screen real British topics. Parallel with legislature and the industry, 
the critical establishment also lashed out against Hollywood and the complex 
nature of its influence on British life – be that linguistic, manners-related and 
cultural. Yet it was the conservative MPs, public administrators and local 
authorities who condemned American films most vehemently. The incident 
Jeffrey Richards recalls4, when officials reproached cinemas for playing an 
active role in the Americanisation of the English language, is only the tip of the 
iceberg. Lawrence Napper‘s summary illuminates the situation in a concise 
manner: ―[c]inema became the symbolic focus, both economically and 
culturally, of fears of the American threat to Britain‘s national life and her 
international status‖ (38). The cult of Hollywood among cinemagoers might 
have been threatening in the eyes of cultural politics, yet the power of film to 
strengthen national cohesion was something of an asset Britain could use. 
Whereas the fears of cultural and economic hegemony were definite, 
Hollywood‘s image of America was enlightening to most European countries 
feeling the pressing need to capture their national symbols and moments of 
national unity on screen. This need urged filmmakers to set out on a mission – as 
Napper writes – ―to represent an indigenous and unchanging version of British 
National Identity‖ (38, emphasis added). The key-words – indigenous and 
unchanging – call for a cinematic memory fostering the untimely national 
heritage, a patriotic imagery that guides the audience towards positive 
identification with British values and way of life. What Hollywood taught to the 
rest of the world is that such an image is never self-evident but needs to be 
constructed through meticulous labour with cinema taking the lion‘s share of the 
job.5 It did not take long for policymakers and public administrators to realise, 
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that, as long as the consumption of images continues on such a massive scale, 
cinema will become a useful vehicle of controlling and disseminating attitudes, 
values, beliefs and cultural identities. 
II. 
With the emergence of mass culture, the scope of negotiating and representing 
national character has been broadened and deepened. The link between the 
strong regulatory function of cultural institutions and the different forms of 
control over cinema has also increased resulting from the insight that more 
institutional control over cinema ensures less ambiguous films. Any government, 
social group or ideological community aiming to impose their will and power 
over people will know that control over the institutions of politics and law is less 
effective than capturing the popular imagination and unconscious desires of the 
masses. The totalitarian regimes of the 20th century successfully managed to 
undermine one with the other, and used – amongst others – the promise of a 
higher race and the communist revolution to sweep politics and law aside. 
Cinema in The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was ―nationalised‖, whereas 
political art and cultural memory received a distressingly uniform shape. To a 
much lesser degree both of these came about in Britain, but not before the late 
thirties and the outbreak of the war. 
Prior to WWII and especially in the first half of the interwar years, the 
situation was very different. The undefined guidelines of institutionalising 
various, often fundamentally discordant vehicles of cultural identification made 
it ever more difficult for cinema to come up with a positive image of Britishness. 
The fact that cultural consumption was class based made the situation of 
filmmakers ever more challenging. Emphasising the social struggle behind the 
British history of cinema, S.P. MacKenzie argues that in the interwar period 
―representatives of the elite society tended to view the mass culture of the lower 
orders with a mixture of incomprehension and disdain, despite – or because of – 
the evident growth in the power of those orders‖ (2). The section of the landed 
gentry and aristocracy who pursued military careers were especially hostile. 
Their contempt for cinema was not based on deep aesthetic considerations but 
part of their general repulsion for the working classes. They could easily dismiss 
cinema for the silly and sentimental treatment of life‘s problems (as seen in 
melodrama) or the irresponsible view of the different branches of the armed 
forces (in war drama), yet their real enemy were not cultural clichés, but the 
social class that cherished them.  
This air of hostility was to change as the international political situation 
turned hopeless and the establishment of national unity gradually became the 
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key to survival.6 Much needed was a cinema that would refine and redefine the 
stereotypical views classes held of each other and establish a new perspective of 
everyday life that was neither marred by escapist dreaming nor by conservative 
fantasies of eminence. Why could cinema be successful in carving out a cultural 
middle ground and determining those values and ideals which all classes shared? 
Well, because it transcended traditional class conflicts and heavily relied on the 
socio-cultural middle ground, the middle-class which by this time had 
successfully managed to assimilate parts of the high and the lower classes. In the 
longer run it was this intermediary space of negotiation that helped to tune down 
the explicit nationalism of the pompous and ultra-conservative aristocracy and 
awaken the spirit of patriotism in the otherwise politically inactive and 
ideologically neutral working class. Before identifying and analysing how this 
―third‖, intermediary space came to shape the war years, I would like to discuss 
the components essential to its emergence. 
III. 
Film production in 1930s Britain was dominated by the so-called ―quota 
quickies‖, low-cost films of the second-feature class, the largest proportion of 
which were comedies. These films often featured the star singers of music hall 
and variety shows and meanwhile ―spoke to working-class audiences of 
community, solidarity and longing‖ (Street 46). The other relevant genre was the 
crime picture (the so-called whodunit) and its popularity peaked among lower 
middle-class audiences. These two dominant genres of the quota quickies – 
despite their rather modest stylistic innovations and emphasis on voyeurism, 
exhibitionism and cheap attractions – were desperately different from American 
products. As Andrew Higson states in Waving the Flag: Constructing a National 
Cinema in Britain, the films identified as quota quickies of working-class 
interest had a strong consciousness for local cultural identity and maintained a 
strong sense of regionalism. The research of Jeffrey Richards and John 
Sedgewick affirms this view and also points out that star cults in working-class 
neighbourhoods differed significantly from middle-class preferences. Whereas 
Gracie Fields and George Formby served as working-class role models of 
honesty, decency and hard work and, consequently, could be admired and 
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identified with7, middle-class audiences preferred Continental and Hollywood 
actors, stars of costume melodramas. In both cases star personalities provided an 
invaluable service to the Establishment by making people (almost 
unconsciously) aware of the accepted and socially beneficial modes of 
behaviour. Napper‘s research into whodunits reveals a strong element of 
resistance to the American influence. He concludes that ―in their thematic 
concerns ‗quota quickies‘ dramatise the fears of a threat to indigenous British 
cultural values. This ‗threat‘ is characterised as being to do with the modernity, 
classlessness and instability implied by the impetus towards social mobility‖ 
(43).  
A key player of the British film industry – London Films Productions – 
reacted to the American influence in a way that strongly shaped the future of 
cinema in the country. None of the histories of British cinema miss to point out 
that Alexander Korda‘s The Private Life of Henry VIII from 1933 single-
handedly conquered the American and international markets. Its key to success 
was the adaptation of high production values partly underlying Hollywood‘s 
success. Korda had a keen eye for the narrative, generic and scenic models a 
film has to follow in order to reach international cult status. The films Korda 
would later produce (and in a few cases direct) in the upcoming years – 
including The Rise of Catherine the Great, The Private Life of Don Juan, The 
Scarlet Pimpernel, I, Claudius – follow in the footsteps of Henry VIII; they are 
all historical biopics or costume melodramas. Like most historical adventure 
films these generically uniform products appealed to the middle-classes. Their 
strengths lay in their deep understanding of quality entertainment and slapstick-
free humour which was combined with seriousness and prudence regarding the 
treatment of national themes. 
IV.  
Is it at all relevant to ask to what extent the above mentioned Korda-films follow 
Hollywood-formulas. They clearly did as far as production values are concerned, 
nevertheless, the situation is more complex as the following quote suggests: 
I might put it epigrammatically and say I believe that international 
films are what good directors make… But perhaps the phrase 
‗international film‘ is a little ambiguous. I do not mean that a film must 
try to suit the psychology and manners of every country in which it is 
going to be shown. On the contrary, to be really international a film 
must first of all be truly and intensely national. It must be true to the 
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matter in it…In my case, if I may say so, it is because The Private Life 
of Henry VIII is English to the backbone I feel it. 8 
Besides spectacle and a straightforward (but never naive) dramaturgical structure 
the Kordaesque international film was universal in appeal but national in spirit. 
In marketing terms Korda offered authentically British topics to foreign markets. 
However, this also meant that his films – and Henry VIII is essential in this 
regard – transcended class-awareness exactly by offering an image of the nation 
as a happy family, the members of which express their love for their country in 
distinct but sincere ways. I should add that although this image was apolitical 
and idealised, it did offer (in a very consciously constructed manner) 
identification with national stereotypes regardless of class and rank. 
After the success of Henry VIII, Alexander Korda‘s London Film 
Productions came up with a series of films that deal with historical figures. It 
was not until This England (1941) and later That Hamilton Woman (1941) that 
the nation‘s past was openly compared to its present, that the narratives came to 
fully embrace a parabolic mode of address. Never has ‗the family of Britain‘ 
looked more dignified than in the films of this period, never has cinema been a 
more sincere mirror of national unity than in 1941. Yet, in a sense, 40s cinema 
began during the mid 30s. For this wartime unity to emerge, major 
transformations needed to take place, a key element of which involved the 
alteration of the group‘s self image, an image no longer drawn up within the 
framework of reference to the global Empire but in terms of the insular nation. 
Films directed by Zoltán Korda (known as the Empire-films) are especially 
important in this regard.  
The first of the cycle, Sanders of the River (1935), starred Leslie Banks in a 
story of an officer of the empire who maintains order and peace in the dark 
corners of Nigeria. Being a film that mirrored both the political conservatism 
characteristic of Kipling‘s prose and the colonial ideology with its racist 
vocabulary, it served as a model-narrative for later films addressing the struggle 
between reason and savagery. In The Elephant Boy (1937), The Drum (1938) 
and The Four Feathers9 (1939) it is within the framework of colonial policies 
that the upper and lower classes came to form a special alliance. They can do so, 
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102 Zsolt Győri 
since the stories are set in the care-free decades the Empire enjoyed during the 
Victorian era. The evidently nostalgic tone of these films called for positive 
identification with Victorian values natural to those members of the 
Establishment who actively participated in sustaining the system of colonialism 
(either in military or administrative ranks). Interestingly enough this included 
both the middle-class (which in the second half of the 19th century saw increased 
possibilities either in the professional fields or the administrative branch) and the 
working-class (many members of which enjoyed upward social mobility by 
joining the army). 
Emphasising its nostalgia and glorious rhetoric, Marcia Landy compares the 
generic model of the Empire-films to the Hollywood western film and its 
reconstruction of the ideologically biased frontier experience. In classical 
westerns the conquering of the land involves the taming or defeating of natives, 
a motif also present in the films of Zoltán Korda (especially in The Elephant 
Boy). The ‗western message‘ offers reassurance and implies that rebellions are 
useless, that control will be regained and colonial rule strengthened. In the late 
thirties such reassurance was vital, after all, the visible disruption of the 
international balance of power and the impotence of European governments to 
stop German expansion worried many. Bearing this in mind, it is by no means 
surprising that the retrieval of order and the defeat of untrustworthy natives and 
constantly plotting aggressors is a recurring motif in these films. Contemporary 
audiences must have had no difficulty in understanding (even if unconsciously) 
that despite the geographical and temporal dislocation, these stories were 
parables emphasising the familiarity between the evil shiftiness of subaltern 
groups and the moral corruptness of Nazism.10 Yet, the caution and indirectness 
of the parabolic address also suggests that a large proportion of people still felt 
uncomfortable to openly embrace the idea of war. The bitter moment of 
disillusionment for pacifists would soon arrive but so would a renewed sense of 
patriotism. This time, however, the new national consensus relied more than 
ever on middle-class values.  
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V. 
The Empire-cycle specific to London Films Production Company saw the 
strengthening of the epic cinema of attractions and a rather conservative topic 
treatment. Spectacular visual effects, but a surprisingly fresh socialist-pacifist 
vision unfolds in London Films‘ big budget adaptation of H.G. Wells‘ Things to 
Come (dir. William Cameron Menzies, 1936). The film looked into the future 
with the challenges of the contemporary situation in mind, proving once again 
the merits of the parabolic address. Apart from its reliance on parabolic 
narration, Things to Come seriously deviated from the tone set down by other 
films, especially in its queries about the state of international politics. It 
predicted the eruption of a worldwide conflict and sought to find out which 
political ideology can best represent the future of ‗the social animal‘. The answer 
proposed by Menzies and Wells is unambiguous: they pled for a more effective 
collaboration between nations while rejecting the idea of the nation state. In 
Things to Come, the safeguarding of international peace is embodied by the 
world-government called ―Wings over the World‖, a technocratic and efficient 
organisation which deals with tyrants in a more successful manner than its real-
life equivalent, The League of Nations. For Wells and Menzies, the war is the 
natural outcome of nationalist policies. The local warlord of Everytown, called 
―The Boss‖, exemplifies how xenophobia – a common feature of both 
nationalism and nativism – leads a community into the dark pool of moral decay, 
militarism, aggression and finally back to the stone-age.
11
 The film arrives at the 
concept of the collectivist idea through its commitment to pacifism and the 
disavowal of social/racial discrimination and pro-war sentiments.  
At this point two questions arise. The first explores whether the denial of 
nationalism and the nation state means the rejection of the nation as a framework 
of identity. The second asks if the pursuit of the collectivist ideals mean 
abandoning traditions, national character and cultural memory. Wells and 
Menzies give a negative answer to both of these questions. The future society of 
Things to Come is made up of a collective of people unified by a common 
ancestry, language, institutions and mentality, furthermore, they share a belief in 
progress (both technical and social). To find an answer to the second question 
we have to consider one of the most disturbing recognitions of Things to Come. 
The film envisions a war generation that has forgotten why the war had erupted 
in the first place and why people fight. Consequently, it suggests that collective 
memory is the only weapon to overcome collective amnesia and ensure that a 
group proceeds towards a future without committing past mistakes. British 
cinema throughout the Second World War will do just that; filmmakers will go 
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to great length to have people remember what they are fighting against and what 
they are fighting for. It is the popular-populist political cinema with a strong 
historical awareness that I will analyse in the next paragraph. 
VI. 
By the eve of WWII cinema had strengthened its position both as a form of art 
and mass entertainment, although the films took little interest in either pure 
aesthetic enjoyment or straightforward entertainment. This period saw the rise of 
political filmmaking. Or was it the rise of propaganda cinema? The scope of this 
essay does not allow me to analyse the complex set of relations between political 
art, political marketing, political propaganda and ideological indoctrination. 
Historically, mass society, mass media and propaganda emerged simultaneously 
and constituted an effective framework of producing and disseminating specific 
contents with the aim to serve and engage large numbers of people. It must be 
added that the term propaganda has a rather pejorative meaning in English, and 
is invariable used to refer to the selective and impartial presentation of facts, to 
emotional manipulation, conditioning of behaviour, even brainwashing. All 
these may be true for propaganda but not apply to British wartime cinema. The 
films I have seen never intended to make people believe things against their 
better judgement, never imposed a limit on individual freedom or altered the 
distinction between fiction and fact in a way as to consciously victimise certain 
individuals and groups. On the contrary, they respected the basic human rights 
of free speech, opinion and belief. 
At the same time, it is also evident that British propaganda did fulfil its 
fundamental function of propagating certain values, patterns of behaviour and 
social practices. In order to address the new challenges posed by the war, 
propaganda aimed to mobilise the masses and guide them towards the sphere of 
public service. Propagandists have long realised that the effectiveness of action 
does not depend on the degree of individuality it is triggered by. Nevertheless, it 
is a dangerous wisdom, since it can be easily abused, as it happened in Nazi 
Germany, where self-sacrifice was glorified so openly and uncritically that it 
became a virtue. Self-sacrifice may have been recognised in the Third Reich as 
the most useful of action, it never came anywhere close to this in Britain. Why? 
Well, because the total subjugation of individuality to the sphere of communal 
interest (as a form of dehumanisation) would have undermined the greatest asset 
of British culture: the common sense of people, their instinctual rejection of 
power-worship and their likewise instinctual affirmation of law.12 In a sense we 
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could say that propaganda is culture-dependent, it is a machinery of readjusting 
and supervising people how to adapt to new situations, yet its effectiveness is in 
positive correspondence with the respect it pays for national characteristics. In 
short: propaganda cannot radically alter what people believe in and what they 
detest. At the same time, values and beliefs often lie beneath the ground in an 
unconscious and raw state, the excavation and fine tuning of which required the 
kind of sensibility and commitment (the parabolic narratives of 1930s) cinema 
has already proved to possess.  
A key issue at the outset of the war was to change the public perceptions 
and sentiments about the necessity of military conflict. Films relevant in this 
regard employed identical strategies; they viewed history, its major figures and 
their achievements to convince people about the self-destructive effects of the 
policy of appeasement. Not surprisingly all the major features during this period 
rejected pacifist sentiments. Korda‘s That Hamilton Woman, Thorold 
Dickinson‘s The Prime Minister (1941) and Carol Reed‘s The Young Mr Pitt 
(1942) are all biopics that deal with passionate political visions and government 
policies at the time of past international conflicts. Korda‘s and Reed‘s films take 
the viewer back to the time of Napoleonic wars and neither fail to point out that 
signing a self-deceptive peace treatise with Bonaparte was a historical blunder 
Britain cannot afford to repeat. The Prime Minister follows through the political 
career of Benjamin Disraeli, a strong devotee of the empire and a close ally of 
Queen Victoria. Nevertheless, what makes Disraeli a model statesman is neither 
his official colonial policies nor the royal support he receives, but his personal 
determination and uncompromising will at the Berlin Conference. All three of 
these films use historical parables to convince people that only fighting till final 
victory will result in lasting peace. In a sense the militant tone of these films 
reflected the precise principles Churchill‘s coalition government followed. 
David Lean‘s This Happy Breed (1944, based on Noël Coward‘s 1939 play 
by the same title), while looking back at the line of events that lead to the war, 
reaches a similar conclusion. The following dialogue between Frank Gibbons, a 
full-hearted patriot and Aunt Sylvia, portrayed as a hysteric and aggressive 
spinster takes place in the late 1930s: 
Frank Gibbons: We shall never have to find ourselves in a position 
when we have to appease anybody. 
Aunt Sylvia: […] I am a woman, I don‘t care how much we appease as 
long as we don‘t have war. War is wicked and evil and vile. Them that 
                                                                                                                                   
point, military display is only possible in countries where the common people dare not laugh at 
the army … Here one comes upon an all-important English trait: the respect for constitutionalism 
and legality, the belief in ‗the law‘ as something above the State and above the individual, 
something which is cruel and stupid, of course, but at any rate incorruptible…Everyone believes 
in his heart that the law can be, ought to be, and, on the whole, will be impartially administered. 
The totalitarian idea that there is no such thing as law, there is only power, has never taken root.‖ 
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live by the sword shall die by the sword. It is more blessed to give than 
to receive.  
Frank: I don‘t think it is more blessed to give than receiving a nice 
kick in the pants for doing it. 
Sylvia. You are a warmonger. That‘s what you are: a warmonger. 
Frank is not simply the mouthpiece of the general wartime sentiment about the 
misdirected policies of the previous decade, but a voice of reason. What he calls 
a ―nice kick in the pants‖ is none other than The Blitz, a moment in British 
history when popular resistance was a matter of life and death. No member of 
the audience would have forgotten this at the time of the film‘s release in 1943. 
In this sense Sylvia‘s stubbornness is depicted as a kind of blindness and 
pacifism as an ideology out of touch with reality. This Happy Breed takes sides 
with Frank, the ―warmonger‖, not because there is anything joyful in violence 
and militarism but because wars are not won by negotiations and diplomacy but 
on the battle fields and on the home front. Although the story ends on the eve of 
the war, we can be sure that Frank, the elderly veteran, will not take part actively 
in the Blitz, yet as a member of the home front his spirit and vigour is an 
essential part of final victory. The characters in the film are all individualised 
and have strong personalities, still, the main protagonist of the story is the 
Gibbons family, a representative middle-class household and more importantly 
an allegory of the British nation. What forges the Gibbons into a family, 
something more than a group of people having the same name, is the profound 
recognition, that, despite their various, sometimes conflicting worldview, they 
can trust and rely on each. In the eyes of Coward and Lean, what applies to the 
family postcard is also valid for the big picture: Britain is forged into a nation, a 
―happy breed‖ by shared responsibility and not a uniform way of thinking. 
VII.  
The aforementioned films offer invaluable assistance in the field of mobilisation. 
In fact the necessity to offer one‘s service comes through as a central motif in 
cinematic propaganda. Clearly distinguished from servilism or servitude, the 
concept of service originated from neither an interior compulsion nor an exterior 
constraint. First and foremost it expressed the active will of the individual and 
the group to overcome inertia and act responsibly. It may be very much the case, 
that the only enemy in war is the passivity and numbness of people, the kind of 
disillusionment characterising Aunt Sylvia in This Happy Breed. The old 
spinster was clearly not the only person to awake to the horrors of war and want 
no part in it.  
We see a similar confusion in the case of Clive Briggs, the character of the 
deserter in Anatole Litvak‘s This Above All (1942). Clive is a kind of modern 
everyman; his dismay over meaningless destruction puts him off from the line of 
duty and forces him to escape from responsibility of any sort. It is not that he 
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doubts the legitimacy of service, the origin of his paralysis is psychological. 
Briggs regains to the power to act after saving a child trapped in a house during 
the Blitz but only after he has regained self-control and learnt the importance of 
self-respect. This Above All articulates an insight shared by numerous other 
films, an insight which could be summarised in the following terms: there is no 
mental security without self-direction, self-respect and self-control and there is 
likewise no action without the peace of mind. This is the lesson Basil Deadren‘s 
The Halfway House (1944) teaches us, a film that depicts how a group of people 
from different classes escape to a country inn from the horrors of war. Acting as 
individuals rather than a community, the first half of the film portrays the 
disintegration of the Family. This pessimistic tone disappears altogether in the 
second half, as the two hosts – allegorising national unity – help the ‗deserters‘ 
return home and regain the sphere of action. They achieve this by urging them to 
undertake self-examination. ―What am I to do?‖ – asks the spiv with the faulty 
conscience at the end of the film. The answer, as the main moral of the film, is 
as follows: ―You are the only one to answer that, look into your own heart‖. 
Looking into one‘s heart is not always the easiest thing to do during 
wartime, in the general state of insecurity. The shared experience of anxiety 
however forges people into this new Family exemplified by such films of the 
social cross-section like In Which We Serve (Noël Coward and David Lean, 
1942) and Millions Like Us (Sidney Gilliat and Frank Launder, 1943). Not a 
single character in these films loses his/her individuality despite the fact that the 
traditional contours of social identities have become blurred. This blurring is 
depicted most beautifully in the final scene of Millions Like Us when women of 
different social ranks sing together in the canteen. The community singing as a 
symbol of the newly forged Family and the recently found common ground of 
the rich and the poor also appears in the short films of Humphrey Jennings (most 
notably in Spare Time and Listen to Britain). Jennings embraced this newly 
founded Family of the British with an almost religious enthusiasm. As Charles 
Drazin argues: ―the religious feeling, I think, stems from not knowing them as 
individuals. Unconcerned with the separate personalities, Jennings was able to 
focus on the humanity common to them all‖ (153). It is not that individuality did 
not count for Jennings; just the opposite. His camera was able to reveal the 
universality underlying individuality, the qualities of faith and courage, as in his 
short documentary Family Portrait (1950). Jennings understands individuality 
and community as terms inclusive to one another, in that they illuminate rather 
than undermine each other, a point also stressed by Aldgate and Richards: ―[t]he 
family above all other images epitomises the ideal of diversity within unity‖ 
(228). 
Neither of the abovementioned films questions the positive correlation 
between individual service and the national interest.13 The strengthening of 
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 The minor character of Clive Seymour in Fanny by Gaslight (Anthony Asquish, 1944) is no 
exception. Although the sentence ―I am a public servant not a private individual‖ suggests the 
108 Zsolt Győri 
community consciousness left uncontested the belief in individuality, yet made it 
evident to the ―individual that he is not altogether an individual‖ (―The English 
Revolution‖), led to the reinforcement of public morale but also led to a specific 
socio-political doctrine taking root in Britain, namely middle-class socialism. 
―The war and revolution are inseparable‖ – wrote Orwell in his essay ―The 
English Revolution‖, a claim he believed was underpinned by the fact that the 
―war turned Socialism from a textbook word into a realizable policy‖. At this 
point we must mention the role of the middle-class which is historically most 
closely linked to progress and social transformation. The middle-class, with its 
strong moral sense and economic independence, has always propagated the 
importance of family, education and public service. The Gibbons family in This 
Happy Breed is the closest wartime cinema comes to articulate the archetypal 
middle-class identity. They possess all the previously mentioned qualities and 
manage to successfully balance between the ideological extremities represented, 
on the one hand, by Reg Gibbons, who in his youth flirted with hard-line 
socialist ideals, and, on the other hand, Queenie, who is enchanted by elitist and 
aristocratic snobbery. Opposing both radicalism and bourgeoisie high-
handedness, the Gibbons find the middle-road and start sharing values associated 
with ordinariness, tradition and respectability: 
Queenie: Seems to me all the spirit has gone out of him [Sam], he is 
just like everybody else now, just respectable.  
Freddie: What‘s the matter with that? […] We are as we are and that‘s 
how we are going to stay and if you don‘t like it well you can lump it. 
But one of these days when you know a bit more you‘ll find out that 
there are worst things than being just ordinary and respectable and 
living the way you‘ve been brought up to live.  
Decency, honesty and respectability are values of positive identification, they 
are attributes of middle-class identity worth embracing. They form the backbone 
of the slow-paced, yet unstoppable revolution associated with modern British 
history. The mistrust of the British towards explosive transformations does not 
mean that there are no moments when change is perceived inevitable. The 
Second World War was such a moment, a moment of revolutionary spirit that 
was heralded by the middle-class, which unlike the working-class and the upper 
class had real potential and affinity to propagate the egalitarian idea. The 
aristocracy lost its grip over society during the industrial revolution and has 
never been able to recover it. Thus its members clinged to outdated traditions 
and political power not out of sheer hypocrisy and vanity but because of the 
insecurity as to what their new role would be after the inevitable social 
                                                                                                                                   
opposite, the narrative context resolves this contradiction. He uses the words to decline his 
social status for gaining undeserving advantages, thus relying on his good conscience instead of 
his class privileges. 
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transformation and modernisation occurred. At the same time the majority of the 
working-class had no positive self-image or class-memory and lacked any 
involvement and historical experience in reform. Only the middle class had both 
the accumulated knowledge and tools to function as social levellers, that is, to 
offer personal qualities, cultural mentalities, lifestyles, and patterns of behaviour 
as models to follow. Also, their attitude to create calculable political, economic 
and legal environments, their inclination to revise values with sufficient 
regularity and the readiness to integrate foreign influences (elements of other 
identity systems), made the middle-class the chief advocator and the catalyst of 
social reform. The combination of these factors paved a way for middle-class 
identity being transformed national identity.  
The representation of women in wartime cinema is also middle-class 
biased. The two most memorable films with a female protagonist of this social 
background are Mrs. Miniver (William Wyler, 1942) and Brief Encounter 
(David Lean, 1945). Intended primarily for an American audience, Wyler‘s 
depiction of the Miniver family, their living standards and social contacts reflect 
the American perspective on the middle-class. Still, the character of Mrs Miniver 
– a courageous, strong-willed, charitable and attractive lady – occupies the 
centre of the local community and uses social intelligence to mediate between 
the lower and higher classes. Laura Jesson of Brief Encounter, on the other hand, 
is genuinely British and genuinely middle-class. Her fragile posture and angelic 
face, perfect manners and emotional self-restraint is complemented with bitter 
rationalism, convincing her that a family and home are more valuable than an 
adulterous fulfilment of her desires.  
Other films, like Millions Like Us and The Gentle Sex (Leslie Howard, 
1943), are not single-protagonist narratives but focus on female communities, 
the members of which undertake demanding and often dangerous physical 
labour without losing their feminine touch. The one thing these women of 
different social backgrounds lose is their class-cherished stereotypes. The motif 
of discovery is a key element in both narratives. Besides exploring the world of 
industrial labour, women also come to share a common ground and mutual 
respect for each other, both of which are the vital for social preconceptions about 
gender roles to shift. Even melodramas (often associated with Gainsborough 
Studios) articulate a similar message. The corresponding research of Aldgate and 
Richards reveals that, although the audience of the historical melodrama 
consisted of working-class woman, ―[t]he clear implication of the films is that 
social change and a levelling of the barriers is needed‖ (163).14  
Including the already mentioned titles, wartime films featuring woman 
protagonists or intended for women audiences propose an image of the gentle 
sex that could not be more different from the one heralded by prejudicious 
Victorian gender politics and traditional sexist representations. Contrary to these, 
they speak of sexual equality and criticise the conservative, male chauvinist 
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 See Britain Can Take It, 157-165. 
110 Zsolt Győri 
view of gender and sexual differences. The fact that even melodrama – described 
at the beginning of this essay as an escapist genre – had a role in this ―tender 
revolution‖ is significant; it proves that the spirit of social self-awareness and the 
general will to gradually evaporate class and gender barriers became part of the 
British psyché, giving rise to a model selfhood that was national because it was 
consensual, and it was consensual because it relied, more than ever, on the 
middle-class. 
Conclusion 
My essay has outlined the origins and evolution of national imagery, a decade-
long process, at the end of which, cinema came to possess a patriotic and 
consensual representation of British values and character. I first described the 
often conflicting sets of influences Hollywood had on British cinema. Ona 
positive note, American popular films taught English filmmakers how to call up 
the community‘s past in glorious terms while also strengthening the spirit of 
national unity among audiences. Alexander Korda and London Films took a 
lion‘s share in adopting the Hollywood model with the introduction of such 
genres as the historical film and Empire-cycle. I identified three key areas where 
London Films had significant influence: 
(1) it played an essential role in popularising films with high production 
values and consequently managed to reach a wider audience; 
(2) its use of the parabolic mode of address ensured that the values and 
beliefs represented as part of the past can reflect upon the present and through 
strengthening or undermining the continuity between the two lay out the 
symbolic sphere of British identity; 
(3) whereas the Empire-cycle of Zoltán Korda argued for national unity 
within the framework of reference to the global Empire, later films, like Things 
to Come put the emphasis on awareness towards the challenges posed by 
aggressive and xenophobic nationalism. 
With the deterioration of the international situation in the late 1930s, 
filmmakers employed historical parables more consciously than ever before to 
denounce the policy of appeasement and the impotency of international 
diplomacy to cope with Nazi Germany. The outbreak of WWII soon made 
cinema into the most important ally of the political establishment with films 
serving as an effective medium of propaganda. Consequently, filmmakers 
abandoned films of pure aesthetic experimentation and pure entertainment. So 
much was at stake in the early months of the war that, in a sense, cinema was 
enlisted and given the mission to boost low public moral, but more importantly, 
to mobilise people and encourage them to joint the home front.  
Propaganda or political cinema had the following characteristics: 
(1) it highlighted the importance of public service, a virtue which runs 
through British history, and thus, is a key national characteristic; 
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(2) as opposed to the totalitarian and indoctrinating rhetoric, British 
propaganda never worshiped self-sacrifice but humanised and psychologised it, 
keeping it well within the sphere of common sense – as another British 
characteristic; 
(3) the image of Britain as a family committed to individual freedom and 
mutual responsibility was popularised in a number of key films from the period, 
(4) the chief propagators of these values were middle-class characters who 
either directly or indirectly argued for a higher degree of social and gender 
equality. 
The realist view of the material, emotional and mental sacrifices of the 
people during the war has entered deep into the national unconscious and has 
had  a lasting effect on the British self-image. This could not be truer for cinema 
which in the period in focus managed to rise to the rank of the people‘s cinema, 
becoming a cinema of national unity. It helped to achieve victory on two fronts, 
not only providing its full support to the war efforts but playing a remarkable 
role in diminishing social prejudices. It is for these socially purposive and 
reformist attitudes that war cinema has come to gain a cult status unlikely to 
melt away any time soon. 
Bibliography 
Aldgate, Tony and Jeffrey Richards. Britain Can Take It: British Cinema in the 
Second World War. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 
Chapman, James. Past and Present. National Identity and the Britisgh Historical 
Film. London: IB Tauris, 2005. 
Drazin, Charles. The Finest Years. British Cinema of the 1940s. London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1998. 
Higson, Andrew. Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain. 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
MacKenzie, S.P. British War Film 1939-1945. New York: Hambledon 
Continuum, 2001. 
Murphy, Robert. ―Under the Shadow of Hollywood‖ In. All Our Yesterdays. ed. 
Charles Barr. London: British Film Institute, 1986. 47-71. 
Napper, Lawrence. ―A Despicable Tradition? Quota Quickies in the 1930‘s.‖ 
The British Cinema Book. Ed. Robert Murphy. London: BFI, 1997. 37-47. 
Orwell, George. ―England, Your England.‖ George Orwell‘s Library. accessed 
23 October 2010. http://orwell.ru/library/essays/lion/english/e_eye 
---. ―The English Revolution.‖ George Orwell‘s Library. accessed 23 October 
2010. http://orwell.ru/library/essays/lion/english/e_ter 
Potamkin, Harry Allan. ―Film Cults‖. The Cult Film Reader. Eds. Mathijs, 
Ernest and Xavier Mendik. Berkshire: Open University Press, 2007. 
Richards, Jeffrey. Age of the Dream Palace: Cinema and Society in Britain 
1930-39. London: Routledge, 1984.  
112 Zsolt Győri 
---. ―The Cinema and Cinema-going in Birmingham in the 1930‘s.‖ in Walton, 
John K., and James Walvin (eds.). Leisure in Britain, 1780-1939. 
Manchester [Greater Manchester]: Manchester University Press, 1983. 31-
52. 
Schaeffer, Eric. Bold! Daring! Schocking! True:A History of Exploitation Films, 
1919-1959. Duke University Press, 2001. 
Sedgewick John. ―Regional Distinctions In The Consumption Of Films And 
Stars In Mid-1930s Britain‖. Institute of Historical Research. accessed 23 
October 2010. <http://www.history.ac.uk/eseminars/sem18.html>. 
Street, Sarah. British National Cinema. London: Routledge, 1997. 
UK Cinema Admissions 1933-2003. Sreenonline. accessed 23 October 2010. 
http://www.screenonline.org.uk/film/facts/fact1.html. 
 
